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Abstract. It is shown that supplementing any usage-based pricing with a flat-fee scheme
is profit improving when the savings from transactions costs and from deadweight loss
by using flat fee exceed the additional production costs. We use a most general model,
without many traditionally used assumptions including single-crossing condition, zero
production costs and specific forms of the existing usage-based scheme. Our convenient
reformulation of the problem enables one to classify markets, suitable for usage-based
pricing only, or only for flat-fee, or for a combination of both. Interesting solution proper-
ties such as Pareto improvement, opening up of new markets, and possible need of some
“critical mass” of adopters of flat fee are shown. Some conclusions hold not only for a
flat-fee supplement, but for any new tariff plan supplementing the existing pricing menu.
Keywords: nonlinear pricing, self selection, screening, flat-fee pricing, buffet pricing,
usage-based pricing, second-degree price discrimination.
1 Introduction
Continuous advances in communication technologies and delivery of information goods
over the past two decades have led to a myriad of pricing options for the sellers of such
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products and services. Today, for many products/services, sellers are choosing between
only fixed-fee, only usage-based scheme or any combination of these two pricing options.
In land-line and mobile phone services, and for software products, a combination of usage-
based and flat fee is widespread. For example, one can buy a tax preparation software
(e.g., Turbotax, Taxcut, TaxAct) for a fixed fee and do unlimited tax returns, or use the
web versions of the same software for a usage-based fee (priced per tax return). Some
sellers only use a usage-based option (e.g., TaxComplete).1
These observed pricing practices raise, at least, two important questions that have
not been completely answered. First, in a most general situation, when and why the
seller should use only usage-based pricing, or only flat-fee scheme, or some combination
of the two? What determines the optimal choice? Second, what are the consequences of
different pricing strategies for welfare, opening of new markets, etc.
Various settings have been used in the literature to model the choice of pricing strate-
gies. One approach taken by Fishburn, Odlyzko and Siders (1997), and by Bala and Carr
(2005) assumes fixed (inelastic to price) demand of any consumer and a two-parameter
distribution of continuous population.2 Then it turns out that the possible reason for
introducing flat fee in addition to a linear usage-based scheme is better partitioning of
consumer population into self-selecting groups. The first paper shows that flat fee can
be more profitable or less profitable than linear pricing under specific distributions. The
1For many other examples and review of literature see Sundararajan (2004).
2Using the same assumption of inelastic demand and two additional assumptions of both high and
low-demand consumers having the same total reservation price for the service and zero production cost,
Essegaier, Gupta and Zhang (2002) compare two-part tariff with flat fee and linear pricing.
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second paper states that the combination of the two schemes is superior than both pure
schemes, for “almost all” parameters. The transaction costs (metering and monitoring
the usage-based sales) is also an additional motivation for using flat fee in Bala and
Carr.3 Similar transaction costs motive is the main reason for flat fee in three papers,
by Nahata, Ostaszewski and Sahoo (1999), Varian (2000), and Sundararajan (2004) with
one-dimensional but elastic demands. The first paper considers two types of consumers
with non-crossing linear demands, and shows that it is the trade-off between some pos-
itive production cost and transaction costs that determines the choice — the more the
monitoring costs under usage-based scheme, the more advantageous is the flat fee. Similar
is Varian’s setting enriched with consumer interaction (product sharing). Sundararajan,
in contrast, takes a continuous consumer population and zero production costs to show
(among other findings) that adding a flat-fee option to optimal nonlinear usage-based
menu is always profitable because of saving from transaction cost. The recent paper by
Wu and Liu (2007) finds the third possible reason for preferring flat fee or combining it
with (nonlinear) usage-based scheme, which is some upper limit on quantity consumed.
Like Sundararajan, they also assume continuous consumer population ordered according
to Spence-Mirrlees condition, but the opposite cost structure — positive production costs
but no transaction costs. Yet, flat fee turns out to be profitable, because of physical upper
3Indeed, usage-based schemes require detailed itemized billings, monitoring and processing payments
and dispute resolution in case of consumers complaints, which a flat fee usually does not require making
transaction costs either small or zero. So traditionally in the informations goods literature transaction
costs are taken to be zero under the flat-fee pricing in comparison with usage-based scheme by normal-
izating the smaller cost to zero.
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bound on consumption together with the assumption that every consumer wishes to reach
this limit on quantity at which price equals marginal cost. These restrictive assumptions
and the result are hard to interpret for the example of amusement parks taken by Wu
and Liu (do typical consumers take rides from opening until closing?). Yet this setting
seems reasonable for Internet providers, since there is technical upper limit on the speed
(limit on quality) which is reached for many consumers.
This paper finds the fourth, independent possible reason for using flat fee, namely cap-
turing part of the deadweight loss as profit. Besides, it purifies the transaction cost idea.
Specifically, in our generalized setting, we consider supplementing an existing usage-based
scheme with flat fee. We either relax or drop all previously used restrictive assumptions,
notably the following: (i) agents’ preferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing
condition (non-crossing demands) and some special condition on distribution; (ii) pro-
duction costs are zero or “very small”; and (iii) the initial tariff menu is given by some
optimal tariff curve in Spence-Mirrlees sense, or two-part tariff, or linear price; (iv) prod-
uct/service is either one-dimensional for continuous population, or two-dimensional for
two consumers, and fixed demand. Although, these assumptions are necessary for using
the standard screening technique, neither these assumptions nor this analytical frame-
work is important or necessary for studying flat fee under our framework. So by dropping
them we achieve most general and realistic setting capturing both deadweight loss and
transaction costs motives, and in addition, introduce transaction costs on consumers’ side.
We briefly comment on realism of the assumptions dropped. First, the Spence-Mirrlees
condition is technically convenient, but often recognized as too strong a condition, not
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quite realistic (see, Masuda and Whang (2006), p. 248, Rochet and Stole (2003)). For
example, businessmen generally would have a high willingness to pay for a small Internet
“traffic,” like e-mail or information search; while children or teenagers have smaller valu-
ation for the first few megabytes, but can consume a lot of “traffic” for fun and games.
Clearly, here the demands of these two consumer groups do cross and the Spence-Mirrlees
condition is violated. Second, concerning marginal production cost, Masuda and Whang
(2006) reasonably argue that the costs of telecommunications or Internet traffic are almost
zero only when there is a spare capacity, otherwise the fixed costs required to increase
the capacity are exactly the variable costs to handle the additional traffic. Third, tariff
plans observed in real life never show a smooth nonlinear tariff curve that is optimal in
Spence-Mirrlees sense. Instead, for most information services, one observes a menu of tar-
iff plans which could include two-part tariffs, or/and fixed-up-to tariffs (FUT, explained
below in Section 2), linear pricing, or some other simple schemes easily understandable by
the buyers. Therefore, supplementing any existing pricing menu with a flat-fee option is
more practical question than supplementing some special tariff curve, “optimal” in some
narrow theoretical sense.
Interestingly, our more general setting also turns out to be more simple. We find an
easy and a convenient way to reduce the flat-fee problem in terms of utility functions into
“demand for flat fee” model, similar to the textbook monopoly model. This enables one to
classify markets into three categories: (i) where flat fee is not needed; (ii) where it should
be combined with a usage-based scheme, and (iii) where it is the only profitable pricing
strategy. Our criterion for introducing flat fee essentially states that for the consumer
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group adopting this new scheme, the related economy from transaction costs plus economy
from deadweight loss should exceed additional production costs from adopting flat fee, no
matter how big marginal production costs are.
Further, using graphical representation of the model and numerical examples, we show
three new solution properties. First, introducing a profitable flat fee always results in
(weak) Pareto improvement, because consumers are free to choose the new or the old
pricing scheme and the seller gets higher profit, though full Pareto efficiency is not reached.
Second, flat fee may open up new markets for the seller, that means new consumers get
served. Third, introduction of a flat fee may require certain “critical mass” of adopters.
It means that first adopters of new scheme (those most interested in it) may bring initial
losses, and the seller may get tempted to abandon it, but when a large group of consumers
adopts, flat fee becomes profitable. Both latter effects cannot occur under Spence-Mirrlees
condition.
Finally, our approach and results can be generalized to goods/services other than
information goods/services. In particular, a simple explanation of the trade-off between
transaction/production costs resulting in three types of markets is presented below by
an example of pricing of breakfast, launch and dinner in restaurants (see this example
to understand the whole setting). Another generalization is that adding any new pricing
scheme, not only flat fee, to a given pricing menu can be analyzed using our framework
with similar conclusions about classification of markets and welfare improvement.4
Section 2 develops a model of pricing menu supplemented by flat fee, and gives the
4Nahata and Ringbom (2007) show that adding a package-pricing scheme to an existing linear pricing
is both profit and welfare improving.
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profitable-flat-fee criterion. Section 3 includes model reformulation, market classification
and solution properties. Section 4 discusses restaurants example; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Multi-tariff Model and Criterion
Consider a multi-tariff screening problem, quite typical in real life, but overlooked in the
theoretical literature. A monopolist offers a menu of several tariff plans to a population
of heterogeneous consumers. The seller cannot discriminate personally. Our specific
assumption is that the initial pricing menu is historically given and the seller’s main
objective is to explore whether to enrich this existing menu or not with a new flat-fee
option. So, we are not optimizing the whole menu simultaneously, instead, we only focus
on the profitability of this new supplement, all old tariff plans remaining the same, not
to disturb the existing loyal customers, or for some other reasons.5 This flat-fee offer is
supposed to be a new pricing possibility, which previously was either infeasible or ignored
by the seller.
2.1 Pricing Menu
We introduce a new useful notion of pricing menu, which consists of a bundle of κ¯ ≥ 1
“tariff plans,” t(.) = (t1(q), ..., tκ¯(q)). Each plan or pricing scheme can be any function
tk : R+ → R+, k = 1, ..., κ¯ defining dependence of tariff tk on quantity q, where, by
definition tk(0) = 0 under non-participation in trade. For example, a tariff plan could be
5One possible reason is Sundararadjan’s interesting Proposition 4, which shows that under certain
assumptions there is no need to change the initial menu after the introduction of flat fee.
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Table 1: Summary of Key Notations.
Notation Explanation
q ∈ Rl+ Quantity or quality of service, it can be multidimensional: l ≥ 1 .
(t1(q), ..., tκ¯(q)) Pricing menu consisting of κ¯ tariff schemes (functions of q).
tκ¯(q) := T for 0 < q Flat fee, a scalar T to be optimized by the monopolist.
Θ = [0, 1] Continuous population of consumers θ ∈ Θ, evenly distributed.
U(θ, k, q, T ) Net-of-tariff utility of θ from q under a given pricing k, T .
V (θ, q) Monetary valuation of quantity, assumed continuous and satiable.
qˇ(θ), vˇ(θ) Satiation level of quantity and maximum attainable utility.
Cp(q) Production cost function, assumed continuous, bounded.
Ctk(q) Transaction cost function, assumed continuous, bounded.
(k(θ, T ), q(θ, T ), τ(θ, T )) Tariff scheme and quantity chosen, with corresponding tariff value.
This function of T is assumed single-valued for “almost all” θ.
k˚(θ), q˚(θ), τ˚(θ) Tariff scheme, quantity and tariff value before flat fee is introduced.
a two-part tariff tk(q) := sk + pkq ∀q > 0, where sk ≥ 0 is the subscription fee or an
entry fee and pk ≥ 0 is the usage charge. A plan could also be a fixed-up-to (FUT) tariff:
tk(q) := {sk when 0 < q ≤ lk, sk + pk(q − lk) when q > lk}, where lk > 0 is the upper
limit on the quantity for this plan and pk is the overage price. The last, κ¯-th number
within our menu is assigned to a flat-fee tariff plan, specified as tκ¯(q) := {T when 0 < q},
where some flat fee T > 0 should be chosen to maximize profit. When T takes some big
value denoted by T˚ (any very big T˚ suffices), which is so high that nobody chooses flat
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fee, then the situation is equivalent to excluding flat fee from the menu, and, in essence,
only κ¯ − 1 available options remain. So, hereafter, the entire κ¯-dimensional tariff menu
t(., T ) = (t1(.), ..., tκ¯−1(.), T ) will be treated as a function of the flat-fee level T , and the
menu without the flat fee as t(., T˚ ). Thus, the main question of combining tariff plans
simply reduces to choosing the parameter T that modifies only the last component of the
menu.
Such menus combining several piecewise-linear tariff plans are observed everywhere
in telecommunications, software products, and, quite often, for many other information
goods and services. Mostly the literature on pricing of information goods has focused on
designing a single optimal tariff plan t(q). What could be the probable reason for this
discrepancy between theory and practice?
Most papers assume that consumer always chooses the cheapest tariff plan. Then,
instead of a menu consisting of multiple plans, we could equivalently define a single-
tariff function tˆ(q) = min{t1(q), ..., tκ¯(q)}, which is the lower envelope of all these κ¯
tariff functions. However, this paper takes into consideration some additional aspects of
consumer behavior, namely, she may not only have preference for certain average quantity
of service, but also for a specific tariff plan because of its convenience.6 In particular,
convenience may include simplicity in making payment, reducing monitoring of billing,
thus economizing some transaction costs on consumer side.
6 The piecewise-linearity of each tariff plan observed in practice is also, probably, because of its
convenience. Besides, the usage of services like telephone can fluctuate from month to month, consumer’s
tariff plan remaining unchanged. This stochastics (beyond the scope of this paper) may give the seller
an additional reason to offer a pricing menu instead of a single tariff plan.
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2.2 Consumers
We neither require any specific form of the utility functions other than quasi-linearity,
nor any assumptions on their ordering. To model such generalized preferences, consider
a heterogeneous continuous population of consumers Θ = [0, 1]. Each consumer θ ∈ Θ
selects a preferred quantity and the related tariff plan from the menu t(.) according to
her valuation V (θ, q) for the quantity q, taking into account tariff and transactions cost.
More specifically, a consumer θ maximizes her utility expressed as
max
k,q
U(θ, k, q, T ) = max
k,q
{V (θ, q)− tk(q) + e(θ, k)}. (1)
The utility depends on a quantity-tariff couple (q, tk(q)) and the tariff-plan number k,
chosen by the consumer. Here e(θ, .) ≥ 0 denotes savings from consumer’s transaction
costs (economized costs). These savings are assumed to be normalized to zero (e(θ, k) = 0)
for all usage-based schemes k < κ¯, but can be positive for flat-fee scheme: e(θ, κ¯) ≥ 0 (it
means that flat fee incurs weakly less transaction costs).
Maximization of the above utility function results in consumer’s choice or “demand”
function (k(θ, .), q(θ, .), τ(θ, .)) : R → {1, ..., κ} × R2 where τ(θ, .) = tk(q). This “choice
function” is assumed single-valued for almost all consumers.7
Valuations V (θ, .) are assumed to be continuous and satiable, and a consumer’s gross
utility from unrestricted usage under flat fee is denoted by vˇ(θ) := V (θ, qˇ(θ)) + e(θ, κ¯),
7This condition on outcomes can be derived from various assumptions on initial functions. For in-
stance, we can assume piece-wise linear usage-based pricing scheme, and valuations V being strictly
concave w.r.t. q and strictly monotone w.r.t. θ. These details are nonessential for the purpose of this
paper, the condition itself being quite realistic.
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where qˇ(θ) is her satiation level of quantity. This satiability assumption is necessary,
because for any nonsatiable demand flat fee is infeasible, making the demand going to
infinity.8 Under our assumption, when e(θ, κ¯) > 0 then vˇ(θ) > V (θ, qˇ(θ)), i.e., the
satiation quantity is strictly preferred to be consumed when paid through the flat-fee
scheme, for those consumers whose transaction costs are really economized by flat-fee
pricing. Besides, V (θ, qˇ(θ)) ≥ V (θ, q) ∀q since unrestricted use is obviously always weakly
better than restricted.
Now let us denote q˚(θ) = q(θ, T˚ ) the consumer’s demand for the situation when flat
fee was prohibitively high (T = T˚ ), so nobody adopted it. The related consumer’s choice
of tariff plan is denoted as k˚(θ) = k(θ, T˚ ), the related tariff is τ˚(θ) = τ(θ, T˚ ) = t˚k(θ)(q˚(θ)).
To complete the description of the population’s preferences parameterized with θ, the
distribution function of parameter θ is assumed to be uniform on [0, 1] (easily generalizable
for a non-uniform case by just adding a density-function symbol f to all integrals below
and rescaling figures).9
8 The assumption of satiable demand overcomes the hardships in utilizing Spence-Mirrlees-based
technique relying either on non-satiablity as in Sundararadjan (2004) or on an upper bound as in Wu and
Liu (2007). Sundararadjan supposes non-decreasing and strictly concave valuation of the commodity, that
obviously entail strictly increasing utility (though bounded from the above). Such unsatiable demand
tends to infinity after adopting flat fee, therefore, strictly speaking, all equilibria in Sundararadjan include
infinite magnitudes of consumption and the whole approach is mathematically non-rigorous. This is not
easy to avoid, since this technique does require strict concavity plus monotonicity assumptions. Thus,
one should either modify somehow the standard Spence-Mirrlees screening methodology when modelling
flat fee (as done in Wu and Liu by imposing a technologically predetermined upper bound), or just simply
avoid using it, as is done in this paper.
9Other distributions need not be modelled explicitly, because any strictly positive distribution can
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2.3 Producer
A producer incurs a variable production cost Cp(q) ≥ 0 and a variable transactions cost
Ctk(q) ≥ 0 when selling the quantity q. The transactions cost is assumed to be zero under
a flat-fee plan, i.e., when k = κ¯.10 The monopolist maximizes profit pi(T ) w.r.t. flat fee
T under initially given usage-based scheme t(.) taking into account the demand function:
max
T
pi(T ) = max
T
∫ 1
0
(τ(θ, T )− Cp(q(θ, T ))− Ctk(θ,T )(q(θ, T ))dθ, where (2)
(k(θ, T ), q(θ, T )) = argmax
k,q
U(θ, k, q, T ), and τ(θ, T ) = tk(θ,T )(q(θ, T ), T )
The monopolist’s optimal solution studied below, is the solution to the above problem.
This means the choice of flat fee that maximizes the total tariffs from all consumers
net of production and transaction costs, taking into account the consumers’ self-selection.
The main formal assumption needed for the validity of this kind of solution notion is quite
weak — all functions used should be integrable. Note the use of equality (k(.), q(.)) = ...
instead of inclusion ((k(.), q(.)) ∈ argmaxk,q(.)), more traditional in screening settings.
We assume that among two or more equivalently good options a consumer chooses one
be reduced to uniform distribution by just rescaling the argument θ of function V . The uniformity
gives an advantage in interpreting some areas in figures as profits. To use the same model for discrete
consumer groups one can just take atomic distribution, then criterion for flat fee remains valid, but the
inverse-demand function discussed in the next subsection becomes stepwise.
10Any nonzero fixed production/transaction costs are normalized to zero, thus requiring no explicit
treatment in our framework. The same goes for normalizing transaction costs – for the least costly tariff
plan it is taken as zero. Therefore, the generality of our setting is not restricted here. Besides, there can
be a more general individualized cost function Cp(q, θ) giving the same results.
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preferred by the seller. Besides, these choices are already fixed at q˚(θ), k˚(θ) for non-
adopters of flat fee. In comparison with Sundararajan’s or Wu and Liu papers, our
simpler approach increases the generality of situations investigated, because the initial
tariff-quantity function t(q, T˚ ) can be non-optimal, or optimal in some specific sense,
accounting for transaction costs.11
2.4 Profit-improving Flat Fee
To characterize the solutions, we can now focus solely on the response of consumers to
some flat-fee tariff T > 0, and estimate only the resulting changes in revenues and costs.
Hereafter, the main notion is the set A(T ) of consumers adopting this new flat-fee option
at T , instead of their previously used scheme k˚(θ). Note that the adopters’ set A(T ) can
include consumers previously not served: θ : q˚(θ) = 0.
The specific form of adopters’ set can be derived from the utility functions as:
A(T ) = {θ : vˇ(θ)− T ≥ V (θ, q˚(θ))− τ˚(θ)}. (3)
Equation (3) means that a consumer adopts flat fee scheme when her related utility (val-
uation vˇ(θ) from unrestricted use, including the convenience of payment simplicity) net of
flat fee exceeds the previous utility, reached under usage-based scheme with prohibitively
high flat fee T = T˚ .
11As we have mentioned earlier, the required simplicity of a pricing scheme in real life seriously limits
the choice of a pricing menu, usually it requires linear plans. Then, the observed initial menu can be
optimal in some non-standard sense, say, being optimal among two-part tariffs, or among some other
restricted functions.
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However, our reasoning does not depend on this specific form of adopters mapping, it
can be just some mapping A(.) : R+ 7→ [0, 1] with natural properties enabling to derive
the “demand for flat fee” in the next section.
Now we state the general criterion that determines when a flat fee should be added
to a usage-based pricing scheme to increase profit. The implicit assumption needed for
the criterion is that the behavior of non-adopters remains unaffected by flat fee, other
assumptions are specified in Table 1.
CRITERION. Adding a flat-fee option to an existing usage-based pricing scheme
(without altering this scheme) is profitable, if and only if, there exists a T¯ such that
∆pi(T¯ ) :=
∫
A(T¯ )
(T¯ − τ˚(θ))dθ −
∫
A(T¯ )
[Cp(qˇ(θ))− Cp(q˚(θ))− Ct
k˚(θ)
(q˚(θ))]dθ > 0. (4)
Here, integrating includes adopters only. The first integral shows the additional rev-
enue from introducing flat fee. The second integral represents the additional production
costs because of increased consumption by consumers group A(T¯ ) minus the producer’s
reduction in related transaction costs.12 In essence, the criterion requires these savings
plus additional revenue to outweigh the additional production cost. This can happen for
two reasons: either consumers’ valuation vˇ(θ) of unrestricted use noticeably exceeds their
valuation of previous consumption V (θ, q˚(θ)) (this means reduction in deadweight loss),
or the reduction in transaction costs is significant, or both.
Under additional assumptions this criterion can also be reformulated as a sufficient
12This difference given by the second integral can be viewed as “net” variable production/transaction
cost. See Nahata et al. (1999) Proposition 1 (p. 222).
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condition in terms of utility functions. For instance, let us assume that we have chosen T¯
so that only one consumer θ¯ adopts flat fee. Suppose this first adopter θ¯ (the consumer
adopting it at the highest fee T¯ ) is at the same time also the consumer giving the highest
per-consumer profit. Then this profit positivity is a sufficient condition for profitable flat
fee:
(T¯ − τ(θ¯, T˚ ) − [Cp(qˇ(θ¯))− Cp(q˚(θ¯))− Ctk(q˚(θ¯))]) > 0 and (5)
vˇ(θ¯)− T¯ ≥ V (θ¯, q˚(θ¯))− τ˚(θ¯) . (6)
In particular, flat fee is profitable when consumer θ¯ does not increase her consumption
too much after switching to unrestricted use, or when the additional production costs
are negligible, outweighed by transaction costs or/and by the additional utility from
unrestricted use, which can be captured as additional revenue T¯ − τ˚(θ¯).13 Thus, this
criterion considerably relaxes conditions found in Sundararajan’s Proposition 2 and in
Wu and Liu, since both assume zero or negligible total production costs, and besides in
the latter paper the high-demand consumers always consume quantity equal to the upper
bound, so additional costs are zero. Besides, from this criterion one can conclude that in
all fixed-demand situations (e.g., in Bala and Carr (2005) and others) adding some flat
fee is profitable under any positive transaction costs. So for profitability analysis there is
no need to assume any specific utility functions, consider particular usage-based schemes
13From mathematical viewpoint, the only profitable consumer brings total profit of zero measure. So,
to make this condition work, we should use continuity of all functions and prove that a measurable subset
of population is also profitable, so by slightly decreaing flat fee below T¯ , we can get measurable positive
profit.
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and distributions like two consumers.
There is also no need to assume that the first consumer adopting the flat fee has the
highest valuation in Spence-Mirrlees sense. We show below that dropping this assumption
entails interesting possibilities like opening of new markets, or first adopter bringing losses,
though next adopters bring profit.
The above general sufficient condition is verbally reformulated as:
Sufficient Condition. When the additional profit from the first adopter of the flat
fee (consumer #θ¯) is positive as in (??), then adding some flat -fee option to a pricing
menu is profitable.
3 Optimal flat fee, market classification and solution
properties
Now we discuss in detail and illustrate graphically the above criterion and the method
to choose the optimal tariff T¯ , that maximizes the additional profit formulated as ∆pi(T )
above. We first explore the behavior of the adopters’ set A.14
14In essence, the adopters’ set and related “demand for flat-fee” (to be discussed below) constitute
a new simpler model of the market, which can be derived from the utility functions, but can also be
considered as a basic abstraction. Actually, the initial screening problem is only an explanation for this
“demand.”
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3.1 Demand for Flat Fee
As the flat fee T decreases from T˚ or +∞ to 0, the set of agents A(T ) adopting the flat-
fee scheme becomes larger in terms of sets inclusion, because anyone adopting the new
scheme would also adopt it under a smaller fee. To formalize this process or mapping, we
assume from now on that consumers are numbered according to the order in which they
respons to tariff T . In other words, agents with parameter θ ≈ 0 are those “first-comers”
who can adopt flat fee at the highest possible fee denoted by Tˇ = sup{T : A(T )6=∅} T ≤ T˚ ,
whereas the agents with θ ≈ 1 join last.
Then, assuming agents do not come simultaneously, we can define a single-valued
strictly decreasing function a : [0, Tˇ ] 7→ [0, 1] describing the marginal adopters of the flat
fee in such a way that the set A(T ) = [0, a(T )] is an interval from 0 = a(Tˇ ) to a(T ). Now
we can obtain an inverse function T(θ) := a−1(θ). Using information about preferences
V (.), vˇ(θ), and the initial payment τ˚(θ), under the assumption of consumer rationality,
T can be defined as a function
T(θ) := vˇ(θ)− V (θ, q˚(θ)) + τ˚(θ).
This T(θ) represents the willingness-to-pay of the θ-th consumer for the unlimited
usage, i.e., the tariff sufficient to attract consumer θ to the flat-fee plan. It can be treated
as the traditional inverse-demand function, keeping in mind that here the “quantity”
is measured in terms of numbers of consumers. Under these terms, a(T ) becomes the
demand for switching, i.e., the number of consumers adopting flat fee at different tariffs.
This representation of flat-fee problem is shown in Fig.1, which is very similar to
the standard textbook representation of simple monopoly. Here, the abscissa shows the
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interval [0, 1] of consumers’ population. Inverse demand T(θ) appears everywhere non-
negative, because unrestricted usage brings weakly more utility than limited use (T(θ) ≥
τ(θ) ≥ 0), and T(.) is decreasing because of the ordering of consumers. Thus, for any
chosen Tˆ , the total revenue under flat fee is the area r =
∫ a(Tˆ )
0
Tˆ dθ = Tˆ a(Tˆ ) = θˆT(θˆ),
which is shown by the rectangle underneath the chosen point (θˆ,Tˆ ) on the demand curve
(see Fig.1(b)) and consumer θˆ is the last consumer served with flat fee.
Now, instead of optimizing Tˆ , we can optimize in terms of this last consumer θˆ. Here
the marginal cost, being marginal w.r.t. the next consumer adopting the flat fee comes
into play. This “marginal switching cost” (MSC) is given by:
MSC(θ) = [Cp(qˇ(θ))− Cp(q˚(θ))− Ct
k˚(θ)
(q˚(θ))] + τ˚(θ).
It includes the net additional costs Cp(qˇ(θ))−Cp(q˚(θ))−Ct
k˚(θ)
(q˚(θ)) from flat fee (direct
costs) and the foregone tariff τ˚(θ) from the previous usage-based scheme, replaced by Tˆ
after switching. In general, the properties of MSC(.) function — positivity, increasing
or decreasing — can vary from situation to situation. Under positive production costs
Cp(.) > 0, and with no restrictions on initial menu, allMSC(.) properties remain unclear.
Indeed, the additional production costs can outweigh economies resulting from transaction
costs. That is why the MSC(.) curve in Fig.1 can intersect the abscissa.
Having explained this transformation of the problem, the choice of optimal last con-
sumer θˆ becomes quite simple and very similar to the choice of profit-maximizing output
under simple monopoly.
The profit-maximizing interval [0, θˆ] served with flat fee is the one where the area
representing revenue ( r(θˆ) = θˆT(θˆ)) minus the area representing the cost (
∫ θˆ
0
MSC(ξ)dξ)
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reaches the maximum.
Under differentiable functions, this point θˆ can be conveniently expressed in terms of
intersection (or not) ofMSC(θ) curve with marginal revenue curveMR(θ) := ∂(θT(θ))/∂θ
shown in Fig.1(b) by the dotted line.
3.2 Classification of Markets
We now address the question posed earlier: Which markets are suitable for combining
flat fee with usage-based pricing and why? Based on Fig.1(a, b, and c), we can classify
markets accordingly. Any market, characterized by functions Cp(.), Ct(.), τ(q, T˚ ), and
T(θ) belongs to one of the following three cases.
a. Only usage-based scheme. It is the case, when for all T , the feasible additional profit
∆pi(T ) from switching to flat fee is weakly negative everywhere, and therefore, flat fee is
not needed. Under differentiability, it simply means that marginal costs of switching is
everywhere higher than the marginal revenue (MR(θ) < MSC(θ) ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]), as shown in
19
Fig.1(a). In particular, but not necessarily, it happens when every consumer’s additional
utility from unrestricted use plus economy from transaction costs on both sides are less
than additional production costs.
b. Usage-based and flat-fee schemes combined. Additional profit ∆pi(.) attains its
maximum in the interior of the population interval [0, 1]. Thus, the most profitable
pricing combination requires some consumers to switch to flat fee and others served with
the usage-based scheme. For this outcome, MR(.) does intersect MSC(.) (MR(θ) =
MSC(θ) ∃θ ∈ (0, 1)), as depicted in Fig.1(b).15
c. Only flat fee. It is the case when additional profit ∆pi(.) reaches its maximum to
the right end of the interval [0, 1], and therefore it is profitable to use only flat-fee scheme
for this population of consumers without any usage-based supplement. In particular, this
happens when MR(.) is everywhere higher than marginal cost (MR(θ) > MSC(θ) ∀θ ∈
[0, 1]), as shown in Fig.1(c). In particular, but not necessarily, it happens when every
consumer’s additional utility from unrestricted use plus economy from transaction costs
on both sides does exceed additional production costs.
To better comprehend this setting and our classification, consider the following simple
numerical example.
Example 1. Take linear demands, i.e., quadratic valuations. Assume V (q, θ) =
1
2
q− 1
20
q2 for all consumers θ ∈ [0, 1
4
) and V (q, θ) = 2q−q2 for all θ ∈ [1
4
, 1], so there are two
groups with homogeneity within each group. For simplicity, assume zero production and
15When there are more than one intersections of marginal revenue and marginal cost, as in Fig.1(b),
some intersections need not relate to profit maximum, since profit need not be concave. One should
therefore be careful in choosing the true maximum.
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transaction costs (we modify the example below with positive production cost). Suppose
that, for some reasons, the seller had used simple monopoly pricing before considering the
flat fee possibility. It is easy to check that the optimal monopoly price was pM = 1. Each
consumer in group [1
4
, 1] consumed quantity q[ 1
4
,1] =
1
2
, paying a tariff τ [ 1
4
,1] = qp
M = 1
2
.
This group generated a total profit equal to pi[ 1
4
,1] =
∫
[ 1
4
,1]
1
2
dθ = 3
8
. Another group of
consumers [0, 1
4
) was not served, because their marginal valuation was everywhere too low
and they are three times less frequent.
Now, suppose the seller tries different levels of flat fee, starting from very high T = 10
and gradually decreasing T . The first group who adopts the flat fee will be the not-
previously-served group [0, 1
4
), at the level T1 = 1.25. Indeed, 1.25 is the maximum
consumer-surplus (the area of the demand triangle) for everyone in this group. Next
comes group [1
4
, 1] at the level T2 = 1− 14 = 34 , because their maximal possible surplus is
1, and under the usage-based scheme they get only 1/4. To see that choosing the tariff T2
is better for the seller among these two options, compare profits piT1= 54
= 1.25 ∗ 1
4
+ 3
8
=
11
16
< pi
T2
= 3
4
= 12
16
∗ (1
4
+ 3
4
) (both are better off than simple-monopoly profit piT˚ =
3
8
). So,
this market turns out to be of type (c), served with flat fee only.
The example shows that flat fee can be profitable in spite of transaction costs being
zero, just because of deadweight loss elimination and opening of new market.
3.3 Solution Properties
Three interesting solution properties can be observed based on our figure and example.
1. Supplementing any existing usage-based scheme with a flat fee is always Pareto
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improving. Generally (not only in this example), all consumers served by the previous
scheme remain unaffected, but all who adopt the flat fee are weakly better off because
previous scheme still remains available, and the seller earns additional profit. For instance,
in the above example, the seller and group [0, 1
4
) are strictly better off. Note that in this
example, even under small positive production costs and zero transaction costs, flat-fee
plan could still remain profitable because the deadweight loss eliminated is rather big.
Note further that Pareto improvement by flat fee is reached in spite of socially excessive
consumption under positive production costs, ignored by the adopters of flat fee. But
eliminating other distortions turns out to be more important and outweigh this distortion.
The more delicate question, however, is: Whether the monopolist chooses the socially-
optimal level T¯ of flat fee? By carefully studying Fig.1 and its interpretation, one can
realize that the flat fee chosen is usually too high and therefore insufficiently many con-
sumers adopt it, for the same reason as insufficient quantity is sold under simple monopoly
pricing.
(2) Under the Spence-Mirrlees assumption one should expect that first adopters of
the flat fee are the highest-valuation users. However, under more general circumstances,
users with low valuation for the first unit of service may end up adopting flat fee first.
Thus, sometimes the firm can even attract new consumers in the market by introducing
flat fee, as illustrated in the above example. Then, opening up new market can provide
a stronger motivation for the introduction of flat fee. For instance, after introducing a
flat fee, the Internet provider can enroll children for using Internet heavily for games and
funs, not only business clients of Internet.
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(3) Interestingly, even when flat fee is profitable, sometimes it is not the very first
group of consumers adopting it who brings positive profit (see case (b) in Fig.1). So,
to overcome the losses from the first group, sometimes the flat-fee plan must create a
sufficient critical mass. This is not the case under the single-crossing condition, but
becomes probable in our more general setting.
To demonstrate it numerically, modify Example 1 by introducing linear production
cost c(q) = 101
400
q. Then the uniform monopoly price is 901
800
and the profit (901
800
− 101
400
) 699
1600
3
4
=
0.286 29. The consumer surplus of the buying group is V (q, θ)−pq = 488601
2560000
= 0.190 86. As
the first-comers group adopts flat fee at T1 = 1.25, it brings slightly negative additional
profit (5
4
− 5 · 101
400
)1
4
= −0.003125. When the other group adopts flat fee at the level
T2 = 1−0.19086 = 0.80914, the profit becomes pi2 = 0.80914− 101400(34 ·1+ 14 ·5) = 0.30414,
which is higher than the other plans. So, here for flat-fee plan to become profitable, the
initial losses from the first-comers must be overcome by enrolling more consumers. So, in
practical experiments with flat fee the seller should not be discouraged by initial losses.
4 Extensions and interpretations
Although obvious, a very important extension of the main criterion and methodology
regarding profitability of adding a flat fee to an existing menu is applicable to adding any
new tariff plan that economizes on transaction costs or eliminates deadweight loss. This
extension follows because the analysis is not based on specific features of any new plan.
As the technology evolves in reducing monitoring and distribution costs of providing infor-
mation services, this important conclusion provides guidelines to the designers of pricing
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options for information goods. We may add that our “quantity” q may be interpreted
as quality also, and thus our approach encompasses both vertical and horizontal product
differentiations, as well as all other kinds of differentiations.
Now, using a real life example we show that our logic is also applicable to many non-
informational goods also. All that is required is to compare the savings from transactions
cost and deadweight loss with additional (not the total!) production cost.
The most illustrative example to demonstrate our market classification is the pricing
practices used by the restaurants around the world. Restaurants in luxury hotels (true for
many other restaurants also) price breakfast, lunch and dinner differently, which can be
regarded as three separate markets. During breakfast time the restaurant serves primarily
the population of guests staying at the hotel; and for many guests quick service can be an
important consideration. The transaction costs here are incurred on both sides — costs
of serving many simultaneous orders quickly for the restaurant, and the cost of waiting
for the service by the consumers. It can be argued that because there is no waiting for
service in a buffet, the willingness to pay for a buffet compared to an a la carte may be
higher, even though some of these consumers might consume about the same amount of
food under both the a la carte and the buffet. In this case the additional production
costs of switching to flat fee can be rather small, in spite of, maybe, a costly food items
(total production cost). Most probably, the savings from eliminating transaction costs
and related deadweight loss on both sides can easily outweigh the corresponding small
increase in food cost. This may explain why buffet during breakfast is widespread. This
example relates to case (c) in Fig.1.
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The lunch in the same restaurant may relate to case (b). Some consumers in this
market want a quick lunch and others may want to eat more leisurely. In order to serve
both types, many restaurants typically offer both options simultaneously — a usage based
a la carte and a buffet for a flat fee.
Case (a) relates to dinners. During dinner time, most consumers eat leisurely and
spend a lot more time. Thus, the potential savings in transaction costs on both sides are
not substantial enough to justify a flat-fee option. Besides, the menu during dinner time
typically includes more expensive items and a dinner buffet might result in a significant
increase in production cost. This may be the reason why usually buffet is not observed
during dinner time and a la carte menu is the most common pricing practice.16
5 Conclusions
The paper presents a simple, yet, a rich enough model for the practical question posed in
several papers: When is supplementing a given usage-based pricing with a flat-fee plan
16Nahata et al. (1999) give many examples of markets for cases (a) and (c). Pricing used by museums
represents markets for case (c). For the case (b), an early historical example is the pricing of public baths
during the Edo period (1603-1867) in Japan, where an adult could take a bath for 8 monetary units or
can also buy a monthly pass for a flat fee of 148 monetary units (we thank Ko Nishihara for providing
this example). Similarly, today the Moscow subway offers usage-based fares for trips of 1, 5, 10, or 20
rides (the more the number of rides, the smaller the average price) and a monthly pass for unlimited use.
Many theaters and theme parks use monthly or yearly flat-fee passes in combination with usage-based
per play or per entry pricing. These convincing examples make a strong case againstr zero production
cost being the sole motivation for supplementing flat fee with usage-based pricing.
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profitable? It is profit improving when elimination of transactions costs is relatively large
compared to the additional production cost, or/and when flat fee can enroll new consumers
or results in decrease in deadweight loss. This general conclusion holds regardless of many
other strong and unrealistic assumptions on consumers’ preferences, optimality of existing
usage-based scheme, and zero production costs, maintained in earlier papers. In practice,
for choosing a flat-fee pricing, the seller should measure (by trial and error) how much the
flat-fee-targeted consumer group is willing to pay additionally for switching to a flat fee,
and then compare this additional revenue with the additional production and the savings
from transaction costs resulting from this switch. Sometimes the group targeted for using
flat fee may consist of new customers or those who do not adopt it immediately, since flat
fee may require a certain “critical mass”.
The introduction of flat fee always results in Pareto improvement, although it may
not be the first-best social optimum.
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